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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jennifer Shaw appeals from her judgment of conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance. She was convicted by a jury and sentenced to a unified seven-
year term, with three years fixed, subject to a period of retained jurisdiction. She 
successfully completed the period of retained jurisdiction and her sentence was 
suspended for a period of probation. 
On appeal, Ms. Shaw challenges the district court's denial of her motion to 
suppress evidence found during a warrantless search of the car she was driving. She 
contends that the officers did not have probable cause to search the car because, under 
the totality of the circumstances, the alleged alert by a canine unit at the scene did not 
provide the officers with probable cause to search her car. She also contends that the 
State failed to prove that the inventory exception would justify the warrantless search. 
Therefore, since the warrantless search was not justified by one of the narrow 
exceptions to the warrant requirement, the evidence found in the car, or at least in the 
closed containers therein, should have been suppressed. This Court should vacate 
Ms. Shaw's judgment of conviction, reverse the district court's order denying her motion 
to suppress, and remand the case for further proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Officer Terry Hodges stopped a vehicle after observing it cross the center line 
and change lanes without signaling. (Tr., Vol.1, p.7, Ls.16-23.)1 The driver, the only 
1 The transcripts in this case are contained in three separately bound and paginated the 
hearing on the motion to suppress on May 2, 2012. "Vol.2" will refer to the volume 
containing the transcripts of the trial held on May 3, 2012. "Vol.3" will refer to the 
volume containing the transcripts of the sentencing hearing held on July 23, 2012. 
1 
person in the vehicle, verbally identified herself as Jennifer Thornton. (Tr., Vol.1, p.8, 
Ls.7-11; Tr., Vol.1, p.9, Ls.11-12.) When the officer ran that name for an information 
check, it was identified as an alias for Jennifer Shaw. (Tr., Vol.1, p.8, Ls.13-14.) Officer 
Hodges also learned that Ms. Shaw had an active warrant for failure to obey a citation. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.8, L.9 - p.9, L.7.) He placed Ms. Shaw under arrest for that warrant. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.9, Ls.8-10.) Officer Hodges also requested a canine unit and a transport 
unit respond to assist him. (Tr., Vol.1, p.11, Ls.9-11.) Ms. Shaw was put in handcuffs 
and placed in the back of one of the police vehicles. (Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI), p.23.)2 
Officer Daniel Vogt responded with his canine companion, Max. He testified that 
he and Max had only been certified to work in the field a few months prior. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.34, Ls.3-14.) Officer Vogt described the training process, which involved presenting 
the dog with various boxes, some of which were known to the officer to contain samples 
of drugs. (Tr., Vol.1, p.21, Ls.17-23.) When the dog sniffed at the box with the sample 
of drugs, the officer would reward the dog by giving him a toy, which, according to 
Officer Vogt, is the only thing the dog really cares about. (Tr., Vol.1, p.21, L.23 - p.22, 
L.7.) The idea is that the dog would make a connection between the odor he had been 
presented with and his toy, and start reacting to it in the field. (Tr., Vol.1, p.21, 
L.24 - p.22, L.1.) According Officer Vogt, while Max had a good record in controlled, 
training situations, he will "fairly frequently" alert in the field when no drugs are present. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.36, L.24 - p.37, L.20.) 
2 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file 
"SHAW JENNIFER psi." Included in this file is the PSI report as well as all the 
documents attached thereto (medical reports, evaluations, etc.). 
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Officer Vogt deployed Max on the car Ms. Shaw had been driving.3 (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.30, Ls.3-10.) He let Max sniff at the open window at the front of the car. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.30, Ls.8-10.) While there was a change in the dog's behavior, Officer Vogt testified 
that Max did not alert at the open window. (Tr., Vol.1, p.30, Ls.8-1 O; Tr., Vol.1, p.44, 
Ls.19-21.) Officer Vogt continued to take Max around the car, and stopped at the 
gas tank. (Tr., Vol.1, p.30, Ls.3-25.) There was a storm drain in the gutter near the gas 
tank. (Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.4-5.) Despite the fact that Max is apprehensive about 
performing his duties when he is on unsure footing, Officer Vogt had Max stand on the 
storm drain while he sniffed the gas tank. (Tr., Vol.1, p.26, L.24 - p.27, L.17 (describing 
Max's apprehension when on uncertain footing); Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.4-5 (describing 
Max's footing when sniffing the vehicle in question).) Officer Vogt testified that he saw 
Max's body tense up and Max tried to sit, but his paws slipped down the storm drain. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.5-17.) Officer Vogt described this behavior as an attempt to alert. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.4-10.) However, when Officer Vogt had Max return to that area of 
the car, he did not alert on the car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.31, L.23 - p.32, L.3.) 
Some time during the course of the stop, a person identifying himself as Charles 
Shaw arrived at the scene.4 (See R., p.73; PSI, p.24.) He identified himself with an 
Idaho driver's license and told Officer Hodges that he was authorized to take the car, 
3 By the time Officer Vogt deployed Max, Ms. Shaw was already under arrest in the 
back of another patrol vehicle. (See PSI, p.23; Tr., Vol.1, p.39, Ls.4-12.) 
4 The information about the interaction with Charles Shaw who, at that time, was 
Ms. Shaw's fiancee, (see, e.g., PSI, p.7), is contained in the police reports, which are 
attached to the PSI. It is not clear whether this information ·was made available to the 
district court at the time of the hearing on Ms. Shaw's motion to suppress; however, 
defense counsel did not present any evidence in that regard at the hearing on the 
motion to suppress. (See generally R., Tr., Vol.1.) Therefore, this information is 
p'rovided only as background for this Court. Ms. Shaw preserves the right to make a 
challenge regarding the non-presentation of this evidence at that hearing in post-
conviction. 
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which belonged to his relatives. (PSI, p.24.) Without any further investigation, Officer 
Hodges decided to impound the vehicle. (Tr., Vol.1, p.11,. L.15 - p.12, L.11 (Officer 
Hodges describing his decision to impound the vehicle; see generally PSI, p.24 (Officer 
Hodges's report of his investigation).) Officer Hodges testified that, once he decided to 
tow the vehicle, he would have also performed an inventory search on the vehicle. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.13, L.24- p.14, L.3.) 
Based on the fact that Max had slipped into the storm drain, which Officer Vogt 
described as an attempt to alert, Officer Hodges began to search the car without a 
warrant. He opened a handbag in the car and found several pill bottles in it. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.12, Ls.22-23.) He opened one of those bottles, which was labeled with the name 
Jennifer Thornton, because it had a baggie inside it. (Tr., Vol.1, p.12, L.24 - p.13, L.2 
(Officer Hodges describing the search of the handbag); Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.13-19 
(Officer Hodges describing why he opened this pill bottle and not the others); PSI, p.30 
#12 (picture of the pill bottle).) The bag contained a "crystal-like substance." (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.12, Ls.23-25.) Officer Hodges admitted he would not open pill bottles during a normal 
inventory search. (Tr., Vol.1, p.16, Ls.11-13.) The Idaho State Lab subsequently 
confirmed that the substance in the pill bottle was methamphetamine. (PSI, p.40.) 
Ms. Shaw moved to suppress the evidence found during the warrantless search 
of the car. 5 (R., p.70.) She asserted that the warrantless search was unreasonable and 
could not be justified under the inventory exception, the automobile exception, or the 
5 According to defense counsel, the prosecutor stipulated that Ms. Shaw had standing 
to challenge the search. (Tr., p.5, Ls.10-12.) The prosecutor did not object and the 
district court agreed, saying, "I don't think there's much question about that." (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.5, Ls.12-13.) 
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Gant exception to the warrant requirement. 6 (See R., pp.72-78.) As part of her 
challenge in regard to the automobile exception, Ms. Shaw challenged the reliability of 
the dog's indications and alleged alert. (R., pp.76-77.) The district court found that Max 
gave reliable alerts, which gave the officers probable cause to search the car. (R., 
p.101.) It did not address the alternate arguments as a result of finding a valid 
exception to the warrant requirement in that regard. (R., p.101.) 
A jury subsequently convicted Ms. Shaw of possession of a controlled substance. 
(R., p.120.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with three 
years fixed, but it retained jurisdiction over Ms. Shaw. (R., pp.137-38.) Ms. Shaw 
successfully completed the rider program during her period of retained jurisdiction 
and the district court suspended the sentence for a seven-year period of probation. 
(Augmentation - Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation; see 
Augmentation - Minutes of rider review hearing.) Ms. Shaw filed a notice of appeal that 
was timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.133-36.) 
6 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), allows warrantless searches of areas within the 
reach of unrestrained suspects or for evidence of the crime of arrest. The prosecutor 
did not advance any argument in regard to the Gant exception. (Tr., Vol.1, p.57, 
L.10 - p.60, L.5.) Also, the district court did not issue a ruling on that ground. 
(R., p.101.) Therefore, it is not addressed in this brief. 
5 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the officers lacked probable cause to search the vehicle because the 
canine unit's behavior, considered in the totality of the circumstances, was not 
reliable so as to provide such probable cause. 
2. Whether the warrantless search of the closed containers in the car was not 
justified under the inventory exception because the State did not prove that the 
search of those containers was conducted pursuant to established policy. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Officers Lacked Probable Cause To Search The Vehicle Because The Dog's 
Behavior, Considered In The Totality Of The Circumstances, Was Not A Reliable 
Indication Of The Presence Of Drugs So As To Provide Probable Cause 
A. Introduction 
While an alert by a trained drug-detection canine is a compelling factor to be 
considered in the totality of the circumstances for the determination of whether there is 
probable cause to search a vehicle, the United States Supreme Court and the Idaho 
Supreme Court have held that, if the totality of the circumstances reveal that the dog or 
the alert is unreliable, it will not provide probable cause for a search of the vehicle. In 
this case, Max failed to alert. Rather, the evidence only shows an alleged attempt to 
alert which occurred while Max, who is known to be apprehensive on unsure footing, 
was actually on unsure footing. As such, the circumstances surrounding the alleged 
alert demonstrate it was not reliable. Furthermore, the dog's training, as described by 
Officer Vogt, does not indicate that he would be reliable in those circumstances. As 
such, the totality of the circumstances reveals that, even if Max was trying to alert, that 
alert was not reliable in this situation. Therefore, it did not provide the officers with 
probable cause to justify their warrantless search. 
B. The Warrantless Search Is Not Justified By The Automobile Exception Because 
The Officer's Did Not Have Probable Cause Based On The Canine Unit's 
Behavior In This Case 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth 
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Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961 ); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 
516, 524 (1986). The Idaho Constitution provides its own, similar protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. IDAHO CONST. Art. I, § 17; State v. Donato, 135 
Idaho 469, 471 (2001 ). 
A unanimous United States Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches 
are per se unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a 
warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment, unless the State 
demonstrates that one of the exceptional, well-established, and well-delineated 
exceptions to this requirement is applicable to the facts. Id. at 390-91; see also State 
v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding the same standard applies to Art. I, § 
17 of the Idaho Constitution), 
One of those exceptions is the automobile exception, which allows officers to 
search the vehicle and containers therein if they have probable cause that contraband is 
inside. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-24 (1982); State v. Gallegos, 120 
Idaho 894, 898 (1991 ). An alert by a reliable, trained canine unit provides probable 
cause. Florida v. Harris,_ U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1059 (2013). "A defendant, 
however, must have an opportunity to challenge such evidence of a dog's reliability .... 
And even assuming the dog is generally reliable, circumstances surrounding a particular 
alert may undermine the case for probable cause-if, say, the officer cued the dog 
(consciously or not), or if the team was working under unfamiliar conditions." Id, at 
1057. Thus, dog alerts do not always provide probable cause by themselves. 
See, e.g., State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 731 (2001) (holding that, absent a showing 
of the dog's reliability, "the dog's reaction does not provide probable cause by itself" 
(though when combined with other factors, probable cause was present in that case)); 
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State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 285 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a dog's alert did not 
provide probable cause to search the defendant in light of other factors known to the 
officers which dispelled a finding of probable cause). Rather, a dog's alert is a factor to 
be weighed in the totality of the circumstances when determining if probable cause 
existed in the given situation. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1057; Howard, 135 Idaho at 731; 
Gibson, 141 Idaho at 285. 
Given the particular circumstances in this case, the alleged attempt to alert,7 was 
not reliable, and thus, his indications did not provide the officers with probable cause. 
Most notably, the dog did not alert where any odor emanating from the vehicle was 
likely to be the strongest: the open front window. (There was wind blowing from the 
back of the car toward the front. (Tr., Vol.1, p.41, Ls.4-8.)) Additionally, the only place 
where the dog purportedly alerted was toward the back of the car. (See Tr., Vol.30, 
Ls.3-10.) As such, any odor emanating from the back of the car would be blown toward 
the dog at the front of the car. Additionally, the window was open there, giving the dog 
7 The district court's finding that "[B]ecause of Max's alerts, there was probable cause" 
(See R., p.101), is not based on substantial or competent evidence and should be set 
aside as clearly erroneous. See State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659 (2007). By 
declaring there were "alerts" the district court ruled the dog alerted more than once. 
(See R., p.101.) Officer Vogt affirmatively testified that the dog's behavior at the front 
window did not constitute an alert. (Tr., Vol.1, p.44, Ls.14-21.) As such, there could 
have been only one potential alert, which, based on Officer Vogt's testimony, was only 
an attempt to alert, not an actual alert. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.4-10.) The alleged 
attempt to alert supposedly occurred while Max, who is apprehensive in performing his 
duties while on unsure footing, was trying to maintain his footing on a storm drain, into 
which he ultimately fell. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.4-19.) As. will be discussed in depth 
infra, that behavior was not sufficient to constitute an alert. In fact, Officer Vogt testified 
that Max only displayed some of the signs of an alert. (Compare Tr., Vol.1, p.23, L.25 -
p.24, L.3 (Officer Vogt describing Max's usual alert behaviors), with Tr., Vol.1, p.31, 
Ls.7-10 (describing Max's behavior at the gas tank); and Tr., Vol.1, p.30, Ls.8-10 
(describing almost identical behavior at the open window, which Officer Vogt testified 
did not constitute an alert).) Therefore, the finding that Max actually did alert was 
clearly erroneous as it was not based on substantial or competent evidence. See 
Henage, 143 Idaho at 659. 
9 
the best possible opportunity to smell the odor of any drugs in the vehicle at the open 
front window. However, Officer Vogt testified that Max did not alert when he was at the 
open front window (though he indicated that he might have smelled something). (Tr., 
Vol.1, p.44, Ls.19-21; Tr., Vol.1, p.30, Ls.18-21.) The dog's failure to alert is a factor 
which is considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis, indicating the alert is 
less reliable. State v. Anderson, _Idaho_, 2012 Opinion No. 123, p.5 (January 
24, 2012). Therefore, the fact that the dog did not alert where the odor (if any) was 
likely to be strongest indicates that the subsequent alleged attempted alert was less 
reliable, and was thus insufficient to provide the officers with probable cause. 
In fact, the evidence is not clear that the dog was trying to alert at all. When Max 
was sniffing at the gas tank, he was not on sure footing because of a storm drain at that 
particular location. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.16-17.) This particular dog has a 
history of being apprehensive when his footing is unsure. (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, Ls.4-17.) 
Therefore, it is unlikely that a dog that is apprehensive when his footing is unsure, 
who will hug the walls to avoid such situations, was doing anything more than trying to 
ensure that his footing was secure, rather than trying to alert to an odor in that particular 
location. And yet, Officer Vogt had him stop to sniff the car while he was on the storm 
drain. (Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.4-5.) Furthermore, when Officer Vogt had Max sniff in that 
area after he fell into the storm drain, Max did not alert. (Tr., Vol.1, p.31, L.24 - p.32, 
L.3.) That adds to the totality of the circumstances demonstrating the dog's behavior 
in this case did not provide the officers with probable cause to search the vehicle. 
Anderson,_ Idaho_, 2012 Opinion No. 123, p.5. 
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Additionally, this dog is known to alert "fairly frequently" when drugs are not 
present. 8 (Tr., Vol.1, p.36, L.24 - p.37, L.2.) That indicat.es that this dog, only five 
months out of his initial training (Tr., Vol.1, p.34, Ls.3-14), is less reliable than other 
drug detection canines. Compare Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058 ( describing the extensive 
training record of the dog in that case, as well as his record in various tests, including 
double blind tests which prevent the officer from cuing - consciously or subconsciously 
- the dog to the presence of narcotics). Furthermore, the training, as described by 
Officer Vogt, also undermines Max's reliability in this situation. According to Officer 
Vogt, he would have Max smell a row of boxes, one of which had a sample of drugs in 
it. (Tr., Vol.1, p.21, Ls.17-22.) When Max sniffed the box known to contain the drugs, 
he would reward the dog by giving it a toy. 9 (Tr., Vol.1, p.21, L.22-24.) Based on 
Officer Vogt's description, Max did not need to do anything except smell where the 
officer indicated to get his toy which, according to Officer Vogt, is the only thing the dog 
cares about. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.22, Ls.2-7.) Therefore, there is no evidence that 
suggests Max was trained to do anything except sniff where Officer Vogt directed him to 
sniff and then look to the officer to get his reward. When the dog is reacting to cues 
from the officer, even if those cues are not consciously given, that undermines the 
reliability of an alert. Harris, 133 S.Ct. at 1057. 
8 Officer Vogt did not bring the log he keeps of his dog's deployments to verify the dog's 
record to the suppression hearing. (Tr., Vol.1, p.38, Ls.18-22.) While it is not 
necessary for the State to present such a log in these cases, it would have provided 
additional information about Max's reliability. See Harris,· 133 S. Ct. at 1054 (the 
deployment logs showed the dog in that case to be more reliable); id. at 1056 
idiscussing the use of such logs in the totality of the circumstances). 
Compare Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058 ( describing the better double blind tests which 
prevent the dog from getting cues from the officer). 
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As such, given the totality of the circumstances surrounding this dog's supposed 
alert in this case, as well as the training it received, it did not give officers probable 
cause to search Ms. Shaw's vehicle. Therefore, this exception does not justify the 
officer's warrantless search of that vehicle and the evidence found therein should be 
suppressed. 
11. 
The Warrantless Search Of The Closed Containers In The Car Was Not Justified Under 
The Inventory Exception Because The State Did Not Prove That The Search Of Those 
Containers Was Conducted Pursuant To Established Policy 
A. Introduction 
When it comes to exceptions to the warrant requirement, the State bears the 
burden of proving that those narrow exceptions fit the facts of the case. When it comes 
to the inventory exception, the United States Supreme Court has held that, where there 
is no established policy regarding searches of containers found during inventory 
searches, opening those containers violates the Fourth Amendment. Since the State 
has failed to establish that any such policy existed in this case, the evidence found in 
the pill bottle, which was itself found in a purse, should be suppressed because the 
opening of both containers to conduct that search is not justified under the narrow 
inventory exception absent evidence of such a policy. 
B. The State Has Failed To Show That The Search Of The Closed Containers In 
The Car Was Conducted Pursuant To Established Procedures, Meaning That 
Search Does Not Fall Within The Well-Defined Bounds Of The Inventory 
Exception 
Another exception to the warrant requirement is the inventory search exception. 
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1976). The warrant exceptions are 
well-delineated. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390-91. The State bears the burden of proving 
12 
that the search falls within the well-delineated bounds of a particular exception, and if it 
does not, the presumption that the warrantless search is unreasonable remains. Id. 
The United States Supreme Court has specifically considered the question of the 
bounds of the inventory exception as it relates to opening closed containers found in a 
vehicle during an inventory search. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990). It held that 
the decision to open such containers must be controlled by established procedures and 
if such procedures do not exist, the search of those containers violates the Fourth 
Amendment Id. at 4. 
The purpose of the inventory exception is for officers to protect the property now 
in their custody, to protect the police against claims of lost or stolen property, and to 
protect against hazards in the vehicle that has been seized. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 
369-70. An inventory search cannot be a ruse for "general rummaging in order to locate 
incriminating evidence." State v. Stewart, 152 Idaho 868 (citing Wells, 495 U.S. 1). "To 
insure the purpose providing the justification for an inventory search is genuine, the 
government must show that any inventory search was conducted in accordance with 
standardized criteria or established procedures." State v. Reimer, 127 Idaho 214, 218 
(1995); see Wells, 495 U.S. at 4. Only in this way will the Fourth Amendment rights be 
protected during such a search. See id. As such, where there is no policy with 
respect to the opening of containers during inventory sea·rches, such searches are 
insufficiently regulated, and thus, violate the Fourth Amendment and the evidence found 
in the container opened during the search is to be suppressed. 10 Wells, 495 U.S. at 4; 
10 This forbidding of "uncanalized discretion" does not mean the officers must behave 
mechanically or simply check off a checklist when conducting an inventory search; all it 
requires is that the discretion in that regard be guided by established criteria. Wells, 
495 U.S. at 4. 
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State v. Owen, 143 Idaho 274, 278 (Ct. App. 2006) (suppressing evidence found in a 
closed container during an inventory search when there was no established policy in 
regard to such searches); but see State v. Bray, 122 Idaho 375, 381 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(upholding a search of closed containers (saddlebags)· despite the lack of an 
established procedure by the agency in that regard because the bags were not locked). 
Officer Hodges did not testify as to whether there was an established policy in his 
office regarding the opening of closed containers during inventory searches. ( See 
generally Tr., Vol.1.) Since it is the State's burden to show that the search in this case 
falls within the bounds of one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, see Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390-91; Reimer, 127 Idaho at 218, and since, to 
fall within the bounds of the inventory exception, the search must be shown to have 
been in accordance with established policy and procedures, Wells, 495 U.S. at 4; 
Owen, 143 Idaho at 278, the lack of evidence as to whether there was such a policy 
demonstrates that the State failed to meet that burden in this case and the inventory 
exception does not justify the warrantless search. As such, the evidence found during 
the warrantless search should be suppressed. 
14 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Shaw respectfully requests that this Court vacate her judgment of conviction, 
reverse the district court's order on denying her motion to suppress, and remand her 
case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 2/h day of March, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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